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ABSTRACT 
When studying work practices, it is important to obtain accurate and reliable information about how work is actually done.  Action research 
is an interactive inquiry process that balances problem solving actions implemented in a collaborative context with data-driven collaborative 
analysis or research to understand underlying causes enabling future predictions about personal and organizational change. Our research team 
has been engaged in action research in software organizations in Norway for two years. In this paper we describe some of the challenges in 
performing canonical action research in software security. We have structured the discussion of the challenges based on the principles of 
canonical action research, and we draw some lessons learned and future work towards improving the adoption of action research in software 
security research.  
CCS CONCEPTS 
• CCS →  Security and privacy →  Software and application security →  Software security engineering
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Software security is about creating software that can withstand a malicious attack, through activities and practices that seek to minimize the 
introduction of security-related bugs and flaws in software systems. This implies that software security doesn't happen by itself, specific work 
practices need to handle this aspect in order to assure that security will be addressed by the software development team [6].  
When studying work practices, it is important to obtain accurate and reliable information about how work is actually done (as opposed to 
how it is described in written procedures or company policies). One of the challenges in doing meaningful research in various areas is to keep 
the balance between methodological rigor and relevance of the research. Action research comes as an approach that attempts to bridge the 
gap between research and practice, and to also provide methodological rigor to the inquiries. The action is usually associated with some 
transformation in a community, organization or project, while the research is characterized by a wide understanding of a transformation 
phenomenon by the researcher, practitioner or both [8]. To obtain this wide understanding of the transformation phenomenon, various data 
collection mechanisms need to be applied, besides the need for close relationship with the software companies.  
Performing security research compounds the challenges of performing empirical research, due to the secrecy and sensitivity of the information 
and artefacts that are dealt with in the organization. In addition, security requirements are mostly non-functional and not really the focus in 
the daily activities of software teams. For example, fixing security-related warnings reported by static analysis tools, performing secure 
coding, or doing a security architecture analysis of the system has not been considered part of the developers' responsibilities in agile teams. 
Therefore, there are extra activities, procedures and challenges to be fulfilled in order to perform action research in software security.  
At SINTEF, we are running the SoS-Agile project (http://www.sintef.no/sos-agile), which investigates how to meaningfully integrate 
software security into agile software development activities. The project started in October 2015. The method of choice for the project is 
Action Research [3], which is an appropriate research methodology for this investigation for several reasons. The combination of scientific 
and practical objectives aligns with the basic tenet of action research, which is to merge theory and practice in a way such that real-world 
problems are solved by theoretically informed actions in collaboration between researchers and practitioners [3]. Canonical Action research 
is one of the many forms of action research [1,10], it is iterative, rigorous and collaborative, involving focus on both organizational 
development and the generation of knowledge.  
Davison et al. [1] describe a set of five principles to achieve the goals of the canonical action research and at the same time promote rigor 
and relevance to the action research study. In this paper we describe some of the challenges in performing canonical action research in 
software security. We have structured the discussion of the challenges based on the principles of canonical action research and we draw some 
lessons learned and future work towards improving the adoption of action research in software security research.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the overall approach to Action Research and Canonical Action Research. 
In Section 3, we describe how we are conducting Action research in software security in the SoS-Agile project. In Section 4, we highlight 
the challenges and approaches, and the main lessons learned. We discuss in Section 5, and conclude in Section 6. 
2 OVERALL APPROACH TO ACTION RESEARCH (AR) AND CANONICAL ACTION RESEARCH 
(CAR) 
The application focus of Action Research (AR) involves solving organizational problems through intervention while at the same time 
contributing to knowledge. The origins of AR can be traced to 1947 with the works of Lewin [12] and Trist & Bamforth, [11]. The evolution 
of AR is detailed in Baskerville et al. [13,14]. In software engineering, diverse authors have applied action research to understand practices 
in software companies [9], concluding that the empirical methodology is a promising way to have more relevant software engineering studies.  
Canonical action research (CAR) is one of the more widely practiced and reported forms of AR in the IS literature. The term ‘canonical’ is 
used to formalize the association with the iterative, rigorous and collaborative process-oriented model developed by Susman & Evered [10], 
that has been widely adopted in the social sciences. One of the reasons for the popularity of CAR is that AR has been criticized for its lack 
of methodological rigor, its lack of distinction from consulting and its tendency to produce either ‘research with little action or action with 
little research’. 
The essence of CAR is to take actions in order to change the current situation and its unsatisfactory conditions [1,2]. Its iterative characteristic 
implies a cyclic process of intervention, with the conduct of (rarely) one or (more usually) several cycles of activities that are designed to 
address the problem(s) experienced in the organizational setting. The rigor of CAR has two key components. First, by iterating through 
carefully planned and executed cycles of activities, so researchers can both develop an increasingly detailed picture of the problem situation 
and at the same time move closer to a solution to this problem. Second, by engaging in a continuous process of problem diagnosis, so the 
activities planned should always be relevant to the problem as it is currently understood and experienced. This relevance thus becomes an 
essential component of rigor in CAR.  
According to Davison et al. [2], the cycles in a CAR consists of essentially five stages (Figure 1): 
1. Diagnostic: consists of exploring the research field, stakeholders and their expectations holistically. In this stage, there is also 
the research theme definition that is represented by the designation of the practical problem and knowledge area to be addressed.  
2. Planning: stage where actions are defined to the circumstances faced. These definitions are guided by hypotheses portraying 
the researchers’ formulated assumptions about possible solutions and results. These hypotheses, on the other hand, should 
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follow the scientific theoretical formulation.  
3. Intervention: corresponds to the implementation of the planned actions.   
4. Evaluation: stage where the interventions' effects are analyzed considering the theoretical background used as basis to the 
definition of the actions.  
5. Reflection: involves the dissemination of acquired knowledge among participants and other organization departments. The 
learning experience is facilitated by previous collaboration among participants and researchers in the technical topics. 
 
Figure 1- CAR Cyclical Process Model [1,10] 
The collaborative characteristic of CAR implies that both researchers and organizational clients must work together in roles that are culturally 
appropriate given the particular circumstances of the problem context. It also implies that the researcher and the client have planned together 
the actions and reached an agreement on how they will work together to get to the results. CAR also involves the combination of theory and 
practice ‘through change and reflection in an immediate problematic situation within a mutually acceptable ethical framework’, with the dual 
intention of improving practice and contributing to theory and knowledge both within and beyond the immediate confines of the project (cf. 
Davison et al. [1]).  A cycle may take weeks, months or even years to complete.  
Davison et al. [1] provide principles and associated criteria that are readily applicable to the practice and review of CAR, to facilitate the 
clear and systematic presentation of ideas and findings, at the same time helping researchers to justify their choices of action, their 
contributions to knowledge and their conclusions. In this way, the rigor and relevance of CAR may be enhanced, which is of course an 
important issue for reviewers who assess the execution and presentation of CAR. We therefore use the principles and criteria defined by 
Davison et al. to describe how we have been performing action research in Software Security. 
3 CONDUCTING ACTION RESEARCH IN SOFTWARE SECURITY IN SOS-AGILE 
SoS-Agile is a research project funded by the Research Council of Norway, investigating two fundamental challenges: the need for a scientific 
approach to security research, and the integration of software security and agile software development. The SoS-Agile Project’s aim is to 
empirically understand how software systems can be designed, built, and maintained to systematically address security issues across an agile 
development lifecycle. Hence, to advance software security practice through explicitly addressing software vulnerabilities with empirical 
approaches to gather data, analyze those data, and develop new theories for the Science of Security. SoS-Agile will enhance the scientific 
excellence of the research in Norway, stimulate new interdisciplinary innovative approaches to improve the security of software systems, 
and strengthen competitiveness in industry, promoting Norway as a cutting-edge research and innovation nation in secure software 
development. 
The project started in October 2015 and will be funded until October 2020. At the time of the writing of this paper, the project has completed 
its second year. In 2016, we were involved with five software organizations (referred to as Organization 1-5). As shown in Table 1, we have 
performed various activities at each of the companies, and some are overlapping.  
Organization 1 is an organization with which we have a longer relationship, and where we have run AR for many years; it is a small/medium 
size organization with less than 100 employees in Norway, Poland, and Finland. 
Organization 2 is a large company in Norway with more than 2000 employees, but we perform the project together with the “innovations” 
subsidiary company of about 50 employees, which is responsible for new projects. Organization 4 is a startup company, and organization 5 
is a small software organization with less than 50 employees.  
The agreement with the participating organizations is that we will perform action research with them as long as it is interesting for them and 
for us. Our contact person from Organization 3 (a public software organization) changed job to Organization 6, which resulted in Organization 
3 not having a contact person that could drive the action research efforts. Thus, we had to move the focus to Organization 6.  
Organization 7 and Organization 8 got interested in the project after seeing some presentations of the results from the studies with the other 
companies. As these organizations are interesting in terms of context of study for software security, we included them in 2017. Organization 
7 is a small/medium size software company with less than 50 employees and Organization 8 is a large software company with more than 60 
different products and teams, where there is a bigger need for governance programs around software security than smaller companies. Smaller 
companies are interesting in the studies on software security because they do not have much resources and there is a higher motivation to 
have effective handling of security during the software lifecycle.  






Table 1 - Overview of the activities in the main companies in the project in 2016/2017. Blue shows activities that the companies 
would like to start until the next year and Orange the activities that we have performed at least once in the company 
2016 Org1 Org2 Org3 Org4 Org5 Org6 Org7 Org8 
JiraSecPlugin implementation [25]         
Defect analysis for Security Defects         
Introduction to software security - Workshop for managers          
Software security introduction - Workshop for development teams          
Survey of software security activities, skills and training needs [6][26]         
Risk Management in Secure Agile Software Development Lifecycle         
Asset Identification         
Protection Poker [21]         
Threat Modeling (TM)          
Secure Coding [24]         
Static code analysis tool Implementation [24]         
Code Review         
Process change Discussions          
BSIMM         
Secure Agile Testing [23]         
Vulnerability Testing         
Design Review/Architecture Analysis          
DevSecOps [20]         
 
2017 Org1 Org2 Org3 Org4 Org5 Org6 Org7 Org8 
Process change Discussions          
Maturity Models (BSIMM and OpenSAMM)         
Training/Awareness Workshops           
Survey of software security skills and training needs         
DevSecOps         
JiraSecPlugin implementation          
Risk Management          
Asset Identification         
Protection Poker         
Threat Modeling (TM)          
Design Review/Architecture Analysis         
Security Testing          
Static code Analysis         
New Focus Areas         
Self-Management For Security         
Incident Management for Security         
GDPR Related activities         
Two years into the project, we have performed some full cycles of this process. In the beginning of this research with the various companies, 
the diagnosing phase is longer and requires more interaction with the companies. We have thus invested in assessment activities regarding 
the actual status of software security in the companies, both in terms of the activities and also knowledge and skills. We have also started 
with some activities that create awareness to the problem of software security, such as meetups, general presentations on software security at 
the companies, and a survey on software security skills and training needs [26]. Some of our results from our collaborations are published in 
[6], [20], [21], [23], [24], [25], and [26]. The reason we have focused on these areas is that we believe they will create the basis for us to build 
the knowledge and fulfill the objectives of the project in a solid manner. After the first period of 3-6 months, the flow of activities with a 
company usually runs better, and the cycles of evaluations shorten depending on the phenomena to be studied. In the second year, we started 
to invest in new areas of improvement for software security such as incident management and self-management.  
One way we evolve is to constantly respond to changes that impact the organizations. GDPR (General Data Protection Regulation) was 
included because of the new EU data protection regulation that will be in vigor in May 2018, the fines are pressuring the software companies 
to review their procedures and implement the state of the art practices in software security. DevSecOps [20] was included because many 
companies are moving towards DevOps in Norway and we needed to create studies that would cover the aspects related to the new challenges 
DevOps brings to software security.  
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4 CHALLENGES AND APPROACHES OF PERFORMING ACTION RESEARCH IN SOFTWARE 
SECURITY 
Davison et al. [5]  propose five principles of CAR. Table 2 shows how we have addressed these principles in the canonical action research 
of the project. We describe the approaches and challenges we have faced to establish a CAR with the organizations.: 
1. the Principle of the Researcher-Client Agreement; 
2. the Principle of the Cyclical Process Model; 
3. the Principle of Theory; 
4. the Principle of Change through Action; 
5. the Principle of Learning through Reflection. 
The Principle of Researcher-Client Agreement (RCA) is the guiding foundation for an AR project and it is also pointed as one of the main 
challenges in the process of action research. However, in order for the RCA to be effective, it is necessary that the client understands how 
CAR works and what its benefits and drawbacks are for the organization. Achieving this understanding may require a process of knowledge 
transfer (from researcher to client). The agreement should contain mutual guarantees for behaviour in the context of the project. A well-
constructed RCA should provide a solid basis for building trust among the various stakeholders and contributes to the internal validity of the 
research. The agreement helps to promote a spirit of shared inquiry, by having clients contribute as the researcher determines goals, plans 
actions, implements changes and assesses the outcomes of those changes. Davison et al. [1] proposes the questions listed in Table 2 for 
assessing the adherence to the Principle of the RCA. As pointed by the authors, ideally these criteria will be met before a project is formally 
initiated, i.e. during pre-project discussions between researcher and client. We follow this criteria for all the organizations in the project. 
On the Principle of the Cyclical Process Model (CPM): When an initial RCA has been established, it is appropriate for the action researcher 
to commence work on the project. The researcher activities will typically be informed by and designed to follow a CPM (Figure 1). The 
extent to which the Principle of the CPM is reflected in a project can be described by the adherence to seven criteria (see Table 2). Progressing 
through the CPM in a sequential fashion will help to ensure that a CAR project is conducted with systematic rigor, a defining characteristic 
of CAR. But it is important to say that as shown in Table 1, there are many cycles running at the same time with different focus.  
The Principle of Theory: The third principle highlights the role of theory in CAR. Davison et al. acknowledge that a CAR project may begin 
with theory-free action learning. However, akin to the traditional scientific method, the diagnostic stage provides a starting point of 
comparison for the post-implementation evaluation. Changes to theory typically take place in the reflection stage of the CAR process and 
lead the project into an additional process cycle. This principle was a challenging one to follow completely as shown in the table and discussed 
in the next sections.  
It is important to highlight that there are not so many theories in Software Security, but we have applied social science theories to understand 
the adoption of software security activities. It is also true that in such a new field, in some of the studies it is hard to know definitely in 
advance the exact theory that will be used or developed, and then the studies with practice are more challenging; then we also have to use 
other types of studies such as experiments to complement the knowledge building process.   
The Principle of Change through Action reflects the essence and the indivisibility of action and change, with intervention seeking to produce 
change. A lack of change in the unsatisfactory conditions suggests that there was no meaningful problem, that the intervention failed to 
address the existing problem(s), or that the existing situation could not be altered because of political or practical obstacles that were neglected 
when the RCA was established. 
The rationale for the Principle of Learning through Reflection stems from the multiple responsibilities of the action researcher: to clients and 
to the research community. This is consistent with the common call for research reports to specify the implications for both practice and 
(further) research. Clients will focus on practical outcomes whereas the research community will be interested in the discovery of new 















Table 2 - Criteria, Approaches and Challenges for RCA in Software Security 
 
Criteria Approaches Challenges 
1a Did both the researcher and the client agree 
that CAR was the appropriate approach for the 
organizational situation? 
Meetings with the companies to discuss the 
goals of the project and the way of working. It 
takes at least three meetings to start to 
establish an agreement.  It is easier to start 
with the action goals and then start 
introducing the research goals after the trust 
with the companies has been established, and 
some results have been achieved on the action 
goals. These goals are revisited periodically. 
It is challenging to tell the companies 
concretely how we will work with them. The 
companies fear that we will be intrusive and 
disturb their work. Security is already seen as 
a costly activity to the projects, and adding 
researcher onus is a concern to the 
organizations.  
1b Was the focus of the research project 
specified clearly and explicitly? 
We framed the research into a broader 
researcher project.  We used self-assessment 
questionnaires based on frameworks such as 
BSIMM/OpenSAMM, as well as a 
questionnaire that assesses skills and training 
needs to have an “initial” map of software 
security activities in the target companies. 
The focus cannot be so narrow that the only 
one interested in the results is the target 
company. It is important to try to find a focus 
that more than three companies are interested 
in investigating together with the research 
group.  
1c Did the client make an explicit 
commitment to the project? 
Because the research is related to software 
security, a non-disclosure agreement (NDA) is 
necessary and important to almost all 
companies.  
One challenging point is the “publication” of 
the results. The type of publications that will 
be permitted need to be explicitly mentioned in 
the NDA. Bigger companies have stricter 
requirements for the NDA and it may take 
many rounds of discussion of the terms. 
1d Were the roles and responsibilities of the 
researcher and client organization members 
specified explicitly? 
The NDA is a good instrument to state the 
responsibilities.  
A major challenge is how to drive the research 
initiative within the organization. It is 
important to have a contact person in the 
company that takes on the role of driving the 
research initiative internally (e.g. A security 
champion, Security Officer). 
1e Were project objectives and evaluation 
measures specified explicitly? 
Meetings with the companies to discuss the 
objectives and evaluation measures. We used 
self-assessment questionnaires to map 
software security activities, as well as 
questionnaires to assess skills and training 
needs as one of the measures to track progress. 
Not all companies were willing to do the self-
assessment. Some companies would like to 
have other metrics for evaluating the return of 
investment in software security, but there are 
as of yet no established metrics we can use.  
1f Were the data collection and analysis 
methods specified explicitly? 
Data is collected in the meetings through 
observation, questionnaires, artefact analysis, 
interviews. It is important to discuss the data 
collection methods and make sure they don’t 
feel that the data collection will interfere with 
their daily work, even more than the newly 
introduced security activities.  
Observation is easier to perform with the 
companies once the trust is established, but it 
becomes difficult to use questionnaires and 
interviews in a long-term relationship with the 
companies, because they get tired of answering 
questions. And it is also hard to justify and 
show that the answers help to improve their 
practices. Especially when the data collection 
is to improve theory.  
2a Did the project follow the CPM or justify 
any deviation from it? 
We have different cycles running in parallel 
with the companies. Each cycle is managed by 
one person (researcher) and focusing on one 
specific topic. The Researcher is responsible 
to give feedback to the company and follow 
up with a report.  
It is challenging to control the variables and the 
effects once that there are different software 
security initiatives happening at the same time. 
Causality conclusions are very rarely done. It 
is easy to forget to close the cycle with the 
feedback. 




Criteria Approaches Challenges 
2b Did the researcher conduct an independent 
diagnosis of the organizational situation? 
We have used BSIMM1 and OpenSAMM2 for 
better discussion of the different topics. First, 
the company performs a self-assessment and 
then discuss the answers with them. Also, we 
participate in strategic meetings for some 
teams, such as planning meetings, daily 
meetings, special meetings for security (e.g., 
threat analysis). These observations add up to 
enhance the diagnosis of the companies. 
It takes time to get a good overview and 
understanding of the company. It takes at least 
6 months to get trust and then to be able to see 
more clearly how the company works. There is 
also a challenge of finding the right format to 
gather data and to be systematic with creating 
journals. Sometimes the companies are not yet 
comfortable with recordings and notes taking 
by the researchers. Another challenge is to rely 
on the practitioners to collect data that 
extrapolate the data they normally collect 
during the development process, as for 
example, time spent doing some specific new 
activity.  
2c Were the planned actions based explicitly 
on the results of the diagnosis? 
Most of the actions come from the evaluations 
from the diagnosis. But also as the project 
progress we also add new interventions based 
on the needs of the company and on the 
interests for research. Planned actions also 
come from bi-weekly discussions with the 
contact person at the companies. In some 
cases we compromise and help the companies 
on the “non-research” topic, to be able to get 
them onboard of another “research” topic. 
It is hard to keep a balance between what we 
want to research as researchers and the 
immediate problems the companies have. For 
example, sometimes they have some 
immediate problem with some “well known” 
technique/approach, that they still have not 
grasped, however for the researcher objectives 
it is not an interesting problem to investigate. 
In our case topics more linked to privacy and 
phishing strategies than to software security.   
2d Were the planned actions implemented and 
evaluated? 
We make a master plan twice a year. This plan 
helps to get commitments to the interventions 
in a shorter period of the time. It also helps to 
frame the focus of the action research with 
each specific company. 
Sometimes the plans of the companies change 
anyways because of some other external 
pressure. So we must wait or cancel the 
intervention with the companies, and account 
for the effort spent in non-finished activities 
can be demanding to the project.  
2e Did the researcher reflect on the outcomes 
of the intervention? 
We focus on writing reports, bulletin boards, 
giving presentations in practitioners' 
conferences to force the researchers to have 
many milestones a year for reflecting and 
getting feedback on the conclusions both from 
the specific company studied and also from 
the other companies interested in the same 
topic.   
The evaluation is the hardest part to remember, 
but focusing on writing the experience reports  
with the companies, helps to mitigate this 
problem.  
2f Was this reflection followed by an explicit 
decision on whether or not to proceed through 
an additional process cycle? 
We have an open communication with the 
companies and we have an agreement that the 
collaboration will happen as long as it is 
giving results to the practice of software 
security to the company and to the research in 
software security. At every evaluation 
meeting or planning meeting with the 
companies we remind them about this. 
It is not always possible to keep going with the 
same topic for a long period at the same 
company, even though we know there is 
further investigation to be made. Sometimes 
we have to have extra meetings to convince the 
company to keep going with that intervention.  
2g Were both the exit of the researcher and the 
conclusion of the project due to either the 
project objectives being met or some other 
clearly articulated justification? 
We have not concluded the project yet. But on 
each cycle there is an evaluation with the 
company on if they would like to continue 
with that specific topic or not.  
The time-limited funding implies that the 
project will be concluded irrespective of all 
objectives being met.  
                                               
1BSIMM: https://www.bsimm.com/download.html 
2 OSAMM/OWASP: https:// https://www.owasp.org 
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Criteria Approaches Challenges 
3a Were the project activities guided by a 
theory or set of theories? 
We use theories of teamwork, diffusion of 
innovation and of acceptance of theories 
(Diffusion of Innovations, Self-management, 
Teamwork and Behavioral Theories) to help 
on the evaluation and intervention of the 
topics of study.  
It is not always easy to gather systematic data 
that fits the theories so that they can also be 
tested systematically. There is no specific 
theoretical framework for software security; 
contributing to building such a framework is an 
important part of this project.  
3b Was the domain of investigation, and the 
specific problem setting, relevant and 
significant to the interests of the researcher’s 
community of peers as well as the client? 
We have internal “research” meetings, twice a 
year to make sure we are driving the efforts 
based on the interests of the research goals. 
We also have publication plans so we can have 
focused interventions for concrete publication 
results.   
The companies are not always interested in the 
“basic” research topic, so we have to frame the 
research topic in a way that shows how 
practical this topic can be to the company. It is 
not always easy to convince the company that 
some extra effort needs to be done for the sake 
of the scientific results.  
3c Was a theoretically based model used to 
derive the causes of the observed problem?; 
3d Did the planned intervention follow from 
this theoretically based model?; 3e Was the 
guiding theory, or any other theory, used to 
evaluate the outcomes of the intervention? 
We use theories such as teamwork 
effectiveness, diffusion of innovation to help 
on the evaluation and intervention of the 
topics of study. We also highlight the 
importance to have thorough review of the 
existing literature to help position the research 
papers within the body of knowledge in 
Software Security. 
There is no specific theoretical framework for 
software security; contributing to building 
such a framework is an important part of this 
project..  
4a Were both the researcher and client 
motivated to improve the situation? 
We have periodical meetings with a contact 
person in the company to follow up the 
relationship with the company and to get 
feedback on the ongoing interventions, and 
also to discuss new issues and start thinking of 
what will the next steps be.  
It is time consuming to have bi-weekly 
meetings with a contact person. And it 
sometimes doesn’t seem to have a concrete 
“agenda” but in a long-term the benefits can 
be seen, especially with the increased 
motivation and relevance of the studies 
performed.  
4b Were the problem and its hypothesized 
cause(s) specified as a result of the diagnosis? 
4c Were the planned actions designed to 
address the hypothesized cause(s)? 4d Did the 
client approve the planned actions before they 
were implemented? 4e Was the organization 
situation assessed comprehensively both 
before and after the intervention? 
With the periodic meetings we get the 
hypotheses and we work to create a study 
together to test some hypothesis. We follow 
up the interventions with the periodic 
meetings and we discuss the results together.  
 
4f Were the timing and nature of the actions 
taken clearly and completely documented? 
We create journals of the different meetings 
and observations, sometimes recordings of the 
interventions.  
It is challenging to be systematic and record or 
create a journal of every single meetings.  
5a Did the researcher provide progress reports 
to the client and organizational members?; 5b 
Did both the researcher and the client reflect 
upon the outcomes of the project?; 5c Were 
the research activities and outcomes reported 
clearly and completely?; 5d Were the results 
considered in terms of implications for further 
action in this situation?; 5e Were the results 
considered in terms of implications for the 
research community (general knowledge, 
informing/ re-informing theory)?;  
Every year we write a report of all activities 
and document the activities done in each 
company. Besides, every year we have the 
publications we have to deliver as outcomes of 
the projects. We address all these points on the 
report and the publications.  
It is important to write experience reports 
because it is more on the language of the 
practitioners. On the more theoretical papers, it 
is not so easy to get feedback from the 
stakeholders. Many times, they are not 
interested in the theories or it is hard for them 
to relate to the theories. We are for example 
trying to investigate the theory of diffusion of 
innovations but it is hard to find a way to 
convince the companies to be onboard.   





This study highlights the methodological challenges involved in applying canonical action research to study software security practices. Here 
we discuss these challenges and implications to research in order to support others who wish to conduct this type of study. We have identified 
six main challenges in conducting the research with the companies:  
1. NDA and Building Trust; 
2. Difficulties in Systematic Data Collection and Journaling; 
3. Difficulties in Systematic Analysis and reporting of data collected from different sources; 
4. Security activities are driven by the research interests/skills of the researchers; 
5. Use of other Social Theories, not only technical; 
6. There is not a set of recognized metrics to measure success of software security programs. 
We highlight that it is not easy to immerse in a company with a dual objective of improving organizational problems and generating scientific 
knowledge. It demands an additional set of knowledge items and skills on the researcher side in order to conduct the process in a proper 
manner and provide relevant results. The researcher needs to formulate theories and ideas, prepare theoretical explanations, and establish 
collaboration with the people and the organization. In this scenario, it is important not to lose focus on the research goals and make constant 
reviews of the study plan and protocol. In Software Security research, the companies need both the reassurance that they will not waste their 
time with “research only” activities and also that they will be protected by NDA’s in the releasing of confidential information from their 
processes and procedures.  
The study also shows a clear need for a particular way to deal with data collection involving software security practices. During the study, 
we made use of techniques that showed to be feasible, such as a combination of interviews, observations, and document analysis. No doubt, 
the use of an interview technique is the one that helps to focus research in a more straightforward way, but it is not always the way the 
companies want to proceed. The researchers need then to be disciplined in collecting data in other forms, and also persuasive to manage to 
do interviews, even if it forces the companies to take extra time to participate in those activities. Considering the researcher role and required 
skill for this type of research, we recommend that the researchers seek to communicate well and openly, participate fully, work together with 
the participants, and be honest, trusting, realistic, and objective. Also, fieldworkers have to be flexible, patient, and persistent in their work 
to overcome the inherent barriers and difficulties of data collection and analysis [7].  
Our project indicates that researchers should balance the role of participant observer with rigorous fieldwork. Rigorousness in data collection 
and analysis is essential in order to avoid bias. It is also important to look for disconfirming instances. Methodological triangulation is a well-
suited approach for this purpose as it can be used to perform a cross-examination [27]. By combining multiple observations, theories, 
interviews, and empirical materials, researchers can overcome the weaknesses and intrinsic biases, address issues of validity and problems 
that occur during action research studies. However, this also brings challenges, as a flood of data collected without necessarily having a clear 
objective in mind inevitably raises a question on how to use some of this data in a scientific way. This is one of the methodological questions 
we want to approach in the project.   
The final product of the action study will depend directly on the decisions of the researcher. These decisions are crucial to allow the production 
of relevant scientific findings, but also to reconcile them with the organization’s business needs. We have the limitation that the security 
activities that are driven with the companies are limited to our research interests/skills as researchers and may not address the main problems 
in software security that the companies have. Here, again, careful planning and execution have to be considered. We also here keep the 
openness and transparency relationship with the companies and we inform the companies of these limitations and point them to seek help in 
external sources to work on the problems we are not addressing.  
The building of theories has diverse challenges. We acknowledge that theories help not only conducting the research and taking actions to 
solve a problem, but also support on reporting study results and positioning them in the existing accomplished research in the field. Our main 
challenge is that it is rare to find good theories in software engineering [4], and there are few empirical software security studies to validate 
practices and approaches; even less in the context of agile software development [15,16,17,22]. We have made use of what Davison calls 
focus theories (a theory that provides the intellectual basis for action-oriented change) [2], for example TAM [18], or the Theory of Diffusion 
of Innovations [19] to focus our research, but not yet of instrumental theories specific to Software Security, due to the lack of such theories.  
Measuring Software Security has generally been acknowledged to be a hard problem [5], and it is therefore difficult to measure the effects 
of the interventions directly. However, we have found that when a Software Security activity directly leads to the elimination of even a single 
bug or flaw, the companies are immediately more positive to the whole process towards investing in software security. This ties into the 
necessity of explaining to the companies "what's in it for them". As mentioned before, the companies are generally not interested in saving 
the world, and will only participate in an AR as long as it serves their business interests. We have found that offering them presentations and 
short courses on practical software security topics goes a long way toward convincing them of the benefits; at least to get a foot in the door. 
5.2 Limitations 
The general criticisms of a methodological study based on a single project also apply to our results and experiences related in this paper, 
among them one may list: uniqueness, difficulty to generalize the results, and introduction of bias by researchers. Another limitation is that 
we were working with the findings of one particular project. We mitigate this limitation by working formally with eight different 
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organizations. We also focus on participating in practitioner conferences to validate the results of the studies.  
In addition, the study shows that running action research in SE has some specific limitations. It is not easy to get involved in a software 
company with a dual objective of solving organizational problems and generating scientific knowledge. In a competitive industry like SE, to 
get information on projects, processes, and practices is not an easy task, because of confidentiality issues and the fact that empirical research 
is not a high priority for this industry.  
We should mention that we do not have a complete list of challenges, thus, further studies should be performed to point to other challenges 
of applying this type of research in software security contexts. Also, there is a risk that our findings could be influenced by factors that 
escaped our attention. One common view is that it is a good practice to discuss and validate findings with other researchers and with the 
participants to seek the completeness of the conclusions. In this sense, using the principles from Davison et al. [1] helped to create a checklist 
and to identify the challenges in a more structured way.  
6 CONCLUSIONS  
Applying action research in practice can be both challenging and demanding, it requires a long time to collect data, sometimes years. In this 
study, we identified challenges in performing canonical action research in software security by using the principles of canonical action 
research to structure the findings. The main challenges we faced have been discussed in terms of the current state of the practice and how we 
conceived the goals for future work. The challenges and approaches related in this paper will help researchers to find solutions to their 
challenges in performing action research, as well as building a knowledge base on the methodological challenges in applying empirical 
research in software security.  
Our next step is to improve our own conduction of action research with the companies, focusing on the principles and following up with 
actions to mitigate the challenges we are facing. We intend to contribute to provide rich narrative accounts of the action research activity in 
Software Security, and elucidate more questions and issues that arise from the use of empirical methods to study software security practices.  
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